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ABSTRACT. This paper studies a dynamicmodel of amarket such as a labourmarket
in which firms post wages and search for workers but trade may occur at a negoti-
ated wage procedure in markets characterized by match-specific heterogeneity. We
study a model of a market in which, in each time period, agents on one side (e.g.,
sellers) choose whether or not to post a price before they encounter agents of the op-
posite type. After a pair of agents have encountered each other, their match-specific
values from trading with each other are realized. If a price was not posted, then the
terms of trade (and whether or not it occurs) are determined by bargaining. Other-
wise, depending upon the agents’ match-specific trading values, trade occurs (if it
does) either on the posted price or at a renegotiated price. We analyze the symmet-
ric Markov subgame perfect equilibria of this market game, and address a variety of
issues such as the impact of market frictions on the equilibrium proportion of trades
that occur at a posted price rather than at a negotiated price.
1. INTRODUCTION
Most firms when advertising a vacancy tend to post the wage associated with it.
However, after a worker is “matched” with the firm in question and the aggregate
value of the match is realized, it may turn out that the posted wage is smaller than
the worker’s outside option but it is mutually beneficial for the firm to hire the
worker but at a non-posted wage. The parties would then typically negotiate over
the wage rate. Many labour markets are characterized like that. Academic ones
being a case in point.
This paper aims to address these and other issues in the context of frictional mar-
kets with match-specific heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity is meant to capture, for
example, markets in which sellers own differentiated commodities and buyers have
heterogeneous preferences. When embedded in the context of endogenous price
determination, it leads us to develop and explore a model that is different from the
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other models in the literature that studies the endogenous determination of the pric-
ing mechanism.
The three main price formation procedures that are typically observed in real-life,
and that have received the most attention from economic theorists are auctions, bar-
gaining and price posting. A common feature of the enormous literature on models
of decentralized markets, however, is that it takes the price formation procedure
as exogenously given. Following Vickrey (1961) there is a large literature on mod-
els in which prices are determined via auctions; while following Diamond (1981),
Mortensen (1982), and, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) there is vast literature on
models in which prices are determined by negotiations; and furthermore, following
Diamond (1971) there is a literature on models in which prices are determined by
price posting.
In models that allow for a price posting mechanism there is a potential, exoge-
nously built-in ex-post inefficiency that arises from the fact that when a pair of
agents meet they have to either trade at some convex combination of the two posted
prices or not trade at all.1 This implies that in an environment characterized by
match-specific heterogeneity, it is possible that trade may not occur (since it might
not be individually rational for at least one of the two agents to trade at such a price)
although it might be mutually beneficial for the agents to trade (but at some other
price). Thus, ex-post renegotiation of the terms of trade can be mutually benefi-
cial. This is not surprising, since the posted price is an incomplete (or, to be precise,
non-comprehensive) “contract” — in that the posted price is not conditioned on the
potential match-specific realizations of the agents’ respective values from trading
with each other. A key novel feature of our market model is that we allow for such
mutually beneficial renegotiation to take place. This price formation procedure may
be called the price posting cum renegotiation mechanism.2
Another novel feature of our model is that we allow one side of the market (e.g.,
sellers) to choose whether to determine the terms of trade ex-post via bargaining,
or to determine the terms of trade via the price posting cum renegotiation mecha-
nism. As indicated above, a main aim of this paper is to endogenously determine
the pricing mechanism as part of the market equilibrium.
As mentioned above, there is a literature that studies the endogenous determi-
nation of the pricing mechanism. Specifically, this literature studies market mod-
els that allow for two of the three potential pricing mechanisms mentioned above.
1This point also applies to models in the literature following Diamond (1971) in which prices are ex-
ogenously assumed to be determined via a price posting mechanism, such as Burdett andMortensen
(1998) and Masters (1999).
2Interestingly, Hart andMoore (1988) established the crucial role of mutually beneficial renegotiation
but in the context of an incomplete bilateral contracting model.
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For example, while Wang (1993), and, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) study mod-
els in which the allowable pricing mechanisms are auctions and bargaining, Pe-
ters (1991), Bester (1993), Wang (1995), Ellingsen and Rosen (2003), Michelacci and
Suarez (2006), and Camera and Selcuk (2009) — like us — allow for price posting
and bargaining. They differ from ours in that they view these as distinct mecha-
nisms to which participants have to commit ex ante. Under our price posting cum
renegotiation mechanism, whether the good is sold at a negotiated or a posted price
will depend on the realized value of trade to the participants.
After laying down our model in the next section, we then, in section 3, derive
some results concerning the characteristics of an arbitrary market equilibrium, and
establish its existence. In particular, we show that in any market equilibrium, the
pricing mechanism will be the price posting cum renegotiation mechanism. Several
results concerning the impact of frictions will also be derived here. One key insight
obtained is that when the matching rates of the two sides of the market are unequal,
then aggregate market welfare would be maximized either when the agents with
the relatively higher matching rate post prices or when the agents with the relatively
lower matching rate post comprehensive price contracts. In particular, the posting
of comprehensive price contracts by agents on the short side of themarket adversely
affects aggregate market welfare.
Then, in sections 4 and 5, we derive — under various, alternative additional as-
sumptions— some further results concerning the properties of amarket equilibrium
such as the impact of market frictions on the equilibrium proportion of trades that
occur at a posted price. A main insight obtained here is that trade in markets with
small frictions is likely to occur at negotiated prices, while in markets with large
frictions it is more likely to occur at posted prices. An implication of this result —
which appears to be consistent with real-life retail markets — is that in retail mar-
kets in which buyers search intensively (such as in housing markets) trade is more
likely to occur at negotiated prices, while in retail markets in which their intensity
of search is negligible (such as in the market for eggs) trade is more likely to occur
at prices posted by the sellers. Section 6 summarizes, and discusses some of our key
modelling assumptions. We relegate formal proofs to the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
The market considered in the model operates over an infinite number of discrete
points in time with two types of agents, namely, “buyers” and “sellers”, who are
respectively denoted by type b and type s; there are a large number (formally, a con-
tinuum) of each type of agent. The market is in a steady state; that is, the numbers
of buyers and sellers in the market are constant over time.
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An important feature of this market is the existence of match-specific, payoff-
relevant heterogeneity: the value to an agent from trading with an agent of the
opposite type depends on the nature of their specific match. Agents of the opposite
types encounter each other through a random, pairwise matching process.3 After
they meet, their match-specific values are realized. The buyer’s and the seller’s val-
ues vb and vs from tradingwith each other are randomly (and independently) drawn
from the distributions Fb and Fs respectively. Thus, if a pair of agents agree to form a
match, and trade at price p, then the buyer’s and the seller’s payoffs are respectively
vb   p and p+ vs. Agents discount future payoffs according to a common discount
rate r > 0.
We assume that Fk (k = b, s) has a bounded support, where the infimum and
supremum of this support are respectively denoted by vk and v¯k. It is assumed that
v¯b + v¯s > 0; for otherwise no gains to trade exist between any pair of agents. The
sequence of events that occur at each point in time t, where t = 0,, 2, . . ., with
 > 0 (but small), is described by the following four-stage process.
 Stage 1: Post a Price? Each agent on one (and only one) side of the market —
sellers, for example — simultaneously posts a price.4 We denote the type of agents
who have this option to post a price by i, where i = b or i = s; the other type of
agents is denoted by j ( j 6= i).
 Stage 2: Random Matching. Each seller meets a buyer according to a Poisson
process with parameter s > 0; and each buyer meets a seller according to an in-
dependent Poisson process with parameter b > 0. After a pair of agents of the
opposite types encounter each other, their match-specific values are realized.
 Stage 3: Renegotiation? A pair of matched agents decide whether or not to
renegotiate the posted price. They will renegotiate if and only if both agree to do so
— the decision to renegotiate is made simultaneously. If at least one agent refuses
to renegotiate, then the process moves to stage 4. However, if both agents choose
to renegotiate, then they engage in the following bargaining process. With equal
probability, Mother Nature picks either agent to make an offer of a (new) price,
which the other agent can accept or reject. In either case the process then moves to
stage 4.
3An alternative to the random matching framework that we could use is “directed” search, in which
the location of sellers and their prices are known but howmany buyers show up at any establishment
is random. While some progress has been made in the use of directed search in a retail context (see
for example Corbae et al (2003) and Michelacci and Suarez (2006)), in our view it is rarely the case
that one knows exactly what prices are being offered by whom when one goes out shopping (even
for relatively large items like refrigerators).
4A posted price is a single number, independent of the match-specific pairs of agents’ values. Notice
that posting a sufficiently high price or a sufficiently low price is formally equivalent to not posting
a price.
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 Stage 4: Trade? The two agents simultaneously decide whether or not to form
a match and trade. If both of them choose to match and trade, then they exit the
market and trade. Otherwise they split up and wait until time t+  when the four-
stage process recurs.
We analyze the symmetric Markov subgame perfect equilibria (Market Equilib-
rium or ME, henceforth) of this stochastic, dynamic game. For any ME, Vb and Vs
respectively denote the associated equilibrium expected payoffs to a buyer and a
seller at the beginning of any time period t.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we characterize the unique ME under the
(alternative) assumption that agents can post comprehensive price contracts (i.e.,
contracts in which the price can depend on the match-specific pairs of agents’ val-
ues). In any ME under this assumption, a type i agent extracts all of the surplus
from any match, which implies that Vj = 0. Consequently, the Bellman equation for
Vi is:
rVi = i
ZZ
vi+v jVi
[vi + v j  Vi]dFidFj.
Since the right-hand side of this equation is decreasing in Vi, it follows that there
exists a unique solution to it in Vi. Hence there exists a unique ME; the equilibrium
posted price contract is p = vb if i = s and p =  vs if i = b.
3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
3.1. Characterization and Existence. The lemma stated below describes the cir-
cumstances under which in any ME a pair of agents will and will not renegotiate,
will and will not form a match and trade, and, if they match, the terms of trade. The
proof of Lemma 1 is straightforward, and hence omitted.
Lemma 1. Fix an arbitrary ME, and consider an arbitrary pair of agents who have met (at
any time t) such that at stage 1 the posted price is p and such that the realized match-specific
pair of values is (vb, vs). Then, in equilibrium:
(a) if vb + vs < Vb +Vs, then the agents do not trade;
(b) if vb   p  Vb and p+ vs  Vs, then trade occurs at price p; and
(c) if vb + vs  Vb + Vs and either (i) vb   p < Vb, or (ii) p+ vs < Vs, then the agents
renegotiate, and trade at price Vs   vs with probability one-half and at price vb   Vb with
probability one-half.
Notice that Lemma 1(c) implies that if the posted price is either arbitrarily high
or arbitrarily low, then, for any realization of the pair (vb, vs), the terms of trade are
determined by bargaining. Figure 1, which divides the (vb, vs) space according to
the four possible equilibrium outcomes described in Lemma 1, may be useful when
understanding the Bellman equations for the players’ equilibrium expected payoffs,
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vb = Vb + p
vs = Vs   p
vb + vs = Vb +Vs
Part (b)
Part (a)
Part (c)(ii)
Part (c)(i)
FIGURE 1. An illustration of Lemma 1.
to which we now turn.5 For convenience, we denote the subsets of all (vb, vs) that
respectively lie in the regions marked Part (b) and Part (c) by 
R(p) and
P(p).
Fix an arbitrary ME, and consider an arbitrary agent of type i (at any time t) who
has posted a price p. Using Lemma 1, it is straightforward to show that his equilib-
rium expected payoff at the beginning of stage 2 (before the randommeeting process
occurs) is
Zi(p,Vb,Vs) =
Vi
1+ r
+
i
1+ r
" ZZ
(vb ,vs)2
P(p)
(vi   I p Vi)dFbdFs+
ZZ
(vb ,vs)2
R(p)
 
vb + vs  Vb  Vs
2
!
dFbdFs
#
,
with I =
8<:1 if i = b 1 if i = s.
5It may be noted that there is a discontinuity in the players’ payoffs at the boundaries between the
areas marked Part (b) and Part (c); this is due in part to our assumption that the players’ types are
perfectly observable.
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Letting pi denote the equilibrium posted price, it follows (by definition) that Vi =
Zi(pi ,Vb,Vs). Hence, it follows that Vi satisfies the following Bellman equation:
(1)
rVi
i
=
ZZ
(vb ,vs)2
P(pi )
(vi   I pi  Vi)dFbdFs +
ZZ
(vb ,vs)2
R(pi )
 
vb + vs  Vb  Vs
2
!
dFbdFs.
Furthermore, optimality requires that
(2) pi = argmaxp Zi(p,Vb,Vs).
Finally, Vj (where j 6= i) satisfies the following Bellman equation:
(3)
rVj
 j
=
ZZ
(vb ,vs)2
P(pi )
(v j + J pi  Vj)dFbdFs +
ZZ
(vb ,vs)2
R(pi )
 
vb + vs  Vb  Vs
2
!
dFbdFs,
with J =
8<:1 if j = s 1 if j = b.
We have thus established that for any solution (Vi,Vj, pi ) to (1)  (3) there exists
a unique ME in which the equilibrium posted price is pi and equilibrium expected
payoffs to any agent of type i and any agent of type j are respectively Vi and Vj.
There exist no other ME.
The following lemma establishes the existence of a ME under various alternative
assumptions on the distribution functions:
Lemma 2. (a) If Fi and Fj are continuous, then there exists a mixed-strategy ME.
(b) If Fj is differentiable, 1   Fj is log-concave, and Fi is degenerate, then there exists a
unique pure-strategy ME.
(c) If both Fi and Fj are uniformly distributed, then there exists a unique pure-strategy ME.
3.2. Equilibrium Pricing Mechanism. Recall that type i agents (effectively) choose
themechanism throughwhich the terms of trade are determined. In particular, aME
can be one of the following two types. A ME in which the posted price is arbitrarily
high (or arbitrarily low) has the property that the terms of trade are always deter-
mined by ex-post bargaining. On the other hand, a ME in which the posted price is,
what may be termed, “serious” (in the sense that it is neither too low nor too high)
has the property that at least some trades are executed at the ex-ante posted price
while others at an ex-post renegotiated price. Proposition 1 below establishes that
any ME is of the latter type.
It is useful to first introduce the concept of the agents’ reservation values. In any
ME, Rb and Rs — where Rb = Vb + pi and Rs = Vs   pi — may be respectively
interpreted as a buyer’s and a seller’s reservation values. A buyer would like to
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trade with a seller at the equilibrium posted price pi if and only if his realized value
from trading vb  Rb. Similarly, a seller would like to trade with a buyer at the
equilibrium posted price pi if and only if his realized value from trading vs  Rs.
Indeed, trade occurs at the equilibrium posted price pi if and only if vb  Rb and
vs  Rs. Otherwise trade occurs at a renegotiated price or trade does not occur,
depending on whether vb + vs  Vb +Vs or vb + vs < Vb +Vs.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Pricing Mechanism). In any ME, v¯b > Rb and v¯s > Rs,
where Rb = Vb + pi and Rs = Vs   pi . In words, in any ME some trades are executed at
the equilibrium posted price while others at an equilibrium negotiated price.
To capture the essence of the proof, suppose that i = b, and, contrary to Propo-
sition 1, that all buyers (such as firms in a labour market) are posting an arbitrarily
low price (wage) which is unacceptable to all sellers (workers). In that case a firm
and aworker split equally the match surplus (when gains to trade exist) via bargain-
ing. Now suppose a firm unilaterally deviates and posts a wage equal toVs  v¯s +,
where  > 0 but sufficiently small. It follows that there exist realizations of vs such
that workers with such realizations would (like the firm) be willing to trade at such
a wage. Since such a wage forces the worker down to (almost) his continuation pay-
off Vs, the firm would (for such realizations) now get all the surplus — rather than
have to split it with the worker. The deviation is, therefore, profitable for the firm.6
At first blush, this result may seem trivial. After all, by allowing one side of the
market to post a price is like granting them market power which they are bound to
use. To see why this result is interesting, consider once more Figure 1. For realiza-
tions of (vb, vs) in the regions marked Part (c), the agents bargain and any match
surplus is divided equally. Within the region marked Part (b), trade occurs at the
posted price and the division of the surplus depends on the actual realization of the
match-specific values vb and vs. In particular, given a posted price p, realizations of
(vb, vs) toward the south-east of this region generates trade such that a seller would
ex-post regret having posted that price — he would receive less than half the match
surplus. The price posting decision amounts to picking a location for the south-west
corner of the Part (b) region on the vb + vs = Vb + Vs line. The type i agent would
like to minimize the probability of outcomes that he would (ex-post) regret vis-a-vis
those which he would welcome. Proposition 1 implies that he can always find a
(serious) price at which the benefits from posting it outweigh the opportunity cost
of not bargaining.
6Thus, the price posting cum renegotiationmechanismwill be preferred by the firms over the ex-post
bargaining mechanism, precisely because it allows them to extract a greater amount of surplus from
some workers without affecting the surplus that they obtain from the others. Without the possibility
of mutually beneficial renegotiation, this result may not hold.
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Proposition 1 implies that in any ME, the equilibrium proportion of trades which
occur at the posted price (rather than at a renegotiated price) is strictly positive,
but (in general) it will be strictly less than one. It is therefore interesting to study
how various parameters (such as those which capture market frictions) affect this
equilibrium proportion. Such an analysis may, in particular, shed some light on the
question of why in some markets trade typically occurs at posted prices (such as in
some retail markets), while in other markets it typically occurs at negotiated prices
(such as in bazaars and some labour markets). We address this issue in sections 4
and 5.
3.3. Role of Market Frictions. We now derive some results concerning the role of
the main parameters (namely, r, b and s) on various aspects of an arbitrary ME.
Our first result concerns the role of the matching rates on aggregate market welfare.
We define aggregate market welfare to be the sum of the payoffs of all the agents
in the market (in a steady state). That is, aggregate market welfare is W = VbNb +
VsNs, where Nb and Ns are respectively the (steady state) measures of buyers and
sellers in the market. Since agents meet in pairs, it must be the case that bNb =
sNs. Hence, after normalizing the measures so that Nb + Ns = 1, it follows that
aggregate market welfare
W =
sVb + bVs
b + s
.
We first state our result concerning the role of the matching rates on aggregate mar-
ket welfare, and then discuss it.
Proposition 2 (Matching Rates andMarketWelfare). LetWCi denote the aggregate mar-
ket welfare in the unique ME under the assumption that type i agents can post comprehen-
sive price contracts, and W Ii the aggregate market welfare in an arbitrary ME of our market
model (in which they post a single price).
(a) If b = s, then WCb = W
I
b = W
C
s = W Is .
(b) If b < s, then WCb >W
I
b and W
I
s >WCs .
Thus, when the matching rates are identical, aggregate market welfare is the same
whether agents can post comprehensive price contracts or just prices. Not surpris-
ingly, it does not matter which side of market gets to post prices. It should be noted,
however, that the distribution of welfare between the two sides of the market will
crucially depend on whether contracts are incomplete or comprehensive.
Another important result contained in Proposition 2 is that when matching rates
are not identical, the posting of comprehensive price contracts by agents with the
higher matching rate adversely affects aggregate market welfare. The insight con-
tained here is that when one side of the market has too much bargaining power —
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by not only being able to post comprehensive price contracts but also by having a
relatively higher matching rate — aggregate market welfare and market efficiency
are compromised. By making such agents post a single price (with the option to en-
gage inmutually beneficial renegotiation), on the other hand, gives some bargaining
power to the other side of the market which has a lower matching rate.
A more general insight that one may extract from Proposition 2 is that the distri-
bution of bargaining power amongst market traders has efficiency consequences. In
particular, a social planner with an objective to maximize aggregate market welfare
should not allow agents on the short-side of the market (i.e., agents who have the
relatively higher matching rate) to post comprehensive price contracts. It should be
noted that Proposition 2 implies that aggregatemarket welfare would bemaximized
either (i) when the agents with the relatively higher matching rate post a single price
or (ii) when the agents with the relatively lower matching rate post comprehensive
price contracts. The next proposition concerns the role of the matching rates on each
agent’s equilibrium payoff.
Proposition 3 (Matching Rates and Equilibrium Payoffs). In any ME, if i   j then
Vi > Vj, and, if i <  j and the difference  j   i is not too large then (also) Vi > Vj.
The results stated in this proposition follow since a type i agent extracts a rela-
tively greater amount of surplus from some type j agents (i.e., for some realizations
of v j) by trading at the equilibrium posted price. Not surprisingly, the ability to post
a price (even with the possibility of mutually beneficial renegotiation) gives a type i
agent a relatively greater equilibrium payoff. And, this is valid even when there are
far more agents of that type than agents of the opposite type in the market.
When the discount rate is arbitrarily small (close to zero), the market contains
negligible frictions. The result contained in the following proposition addresses, in
particular, this limiting case of negligible market frictions.
Proposition 4 (Discount Rates and Sum of Equilibrium Payoffs). In any ME, the sum
R of the equilibrium payoffs to a pair of agents of the opposite types is strictly decreasing in
r. Furthermore, R ! v¯b + v¯s as r ! 0, and, R ! 0 as r ! 1, where R = Vb +Vs.
Aswould be expected, aggregatemarket welfare increases as the degree of market
frictions decreases. In particular, Proposition 4 implies that when market frictions
are negligible, in anyME, trade occurs between a buyer and a seller if and only if the
realized match-specific pair of values (vb, vs) are arbitrarily close to the pair (v¯b, v¯s).
This makes intuitive sense; when frictions are negligible, the cost to each agent of
locating the almost perfect match is negligible — and therefore, each agent waits to
match with an agent of the opposite type who will generate almost maximal value
for him.
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4. THE CASE OF UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS
In order to obtain some additional insights concerning the properties of Market
Equilibria, over and above those obtained in section 3 above, we now study the
unique ME when both Fi and Fj are uniformly distributed. Although the results
discussed here are specific to this case, the intuition behind them suggest that some
(but certainly not all) of these results may actually holdmore generally. In particular,
we explore the impact of market frictions on (i) the equilibrium proportion of trades
that occur at a posted price, and (ii) the equilibrium payoffs to type i and type j
agents. In this section (only) we assume, without loss of generality, that i = b (i.e.,
buyers post prices); this assumption fits, for example, labour markets in which firms
post wages.
Proposition 5 (The Case of Uniform Distributions). If i = b, and, both Fb and Fs are
uniformly distributed, then the unique ME possesses the following properties.
(a) There exists an r¯ such that over the interval (0, r¯), a change in the discount rate r has in
general an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium posted price. However, if b = s, then the
equilibrium posted price is strictly decreasing in r; but if s is sufficiently larger than b,
then the equilibrium posted price is strictly increasing in r.
(b) The equilibrium proportion of trades which occur at the posted price — we denote this
proportion by  — equals 1/3 for any r 2 (0, r¯). For any r > r¯,  is strictly increasing in r.
Before we discuss the results stated in this proposition, we first report the results
of a simulation that reveals a few other interesting properties of the unique ME for
larger values of the discount rate, but when the matching rates are identical.7 The
results of the simulation in question are stated in Table 1. As is evident, the results
of this simulation are consistent with the appropriate results stated in Proposition
5 above. There are, however, some other revealing results in this simulation that
we have not been able to establish analytically. For example, as can be seen from
Table 1, the difference Vb   Vs does not vanish as r becomes negligible. This result
is particularly interesting as it implies that our ME outcome does not approximate
the “competitive” equilibrium outcome even as market frictions become negligible.8
Themessage here is that even under frictionless conditions, the option to post prices
confers a strategic advantage.
A key intuition that underlies all of these results runs as follows. When thematch-
ing rates are identical, then the only asymmetry between a firm and a worker is that
the firm has the option to post a wage, which works to its advantage; in particular,
7The model was simulated, with most of the results to be shortly discussed captured also in the
several other simulations that we conducted but which we shall not report here.
8In a “competitive” equilibrium outcome of our market, all agents would earn the same expected
payoff.
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r R pb Vb Vs 
.001 14.2 4.22 9.15 5.05 0.33
0.01 13.3 3.93 8.71 4.59 0.41
0.1 10.9 2.45 8.22 2.68 0.78
0.2 9.69 1.87 7.82 1.87 0.9
0.3 8.86 1.47 7.39 1.47 0.91
0.4 8.21 1.22 6.99 1.22 0.97
0.5 7.67 1.00 6.67 1 1
TABLE 1. Results of a simulation: Equilibrium when Fb and Fs are
uniformly distributed, b = s = 1, v¯s = 1, vs = 0, v¯b = 14 and
vb = 8.
the greater the degree of market frictions (i.e., the higher the value of r) the bigger is
that advantage. This is because the worker’s “outside option” — which is to wait
and find an alternative trading partner — is less attractive the greater the degree
of market frictions. However, when a worker’s matching rate is sufficiently large
relative to a firm’s matching rate, the worker’s outside option is relatively more at-
tractive than the firm’s outside option, and this works to the worker’s advantage.
Hence when s is sufficiently larger than b, the equilibrium posted wage is strictly
increasing in r (Proposition 5(a)).
As can be seen from Table 1, when the matching rates are identical, bothVb andVs
are strictly decreasing in r. Furthermore, the ratio Vb=Vs increases with the discount
rate. This result indicates that the relative advantage that type i agents have over
type j agents increases with the degree of market frictions.
Although the result established in Proposition 5(b) that  , the equilibrium pro-
portion of trades at the posted price, is constant for small values of r may not be
robust to other specifications of the distributions, the result that  is (in general) in-
creasing in r will be shown (in the next section) to hold under a more general class
of distributions. Thus, a key insight from our model may be put as follows: trade
in markets with small frictions is likely to occur at negotiated prices, while in markets with
large frictions it is more likely to occur at posted prices.
To illustrate the intuition for this insight in a fairly transparent manner, let us con-
sider the two extreme cases of very large and very small degrees of market friction.
In the former case, waiting to find an alternative trading partner is quite costly, and
thus, the agents’ outside options are pretty unattractive. This immediately implies
that trade at the posted price will tend to be individually rational for any pair of
agents. In the latter case, on the other hand, the reverse holds: the outside options
of both agents are pretty attractive, and thus, trade at the posted price will tend not
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to be individually rational for at least one them. Hence, trade is more likely to occur
at an ex-post negotiated price.
5. ONE-SIDED HETEROGENEITY
We now study the unique ME under the assumption that Fi is degenerate (i.e.,
v¯i = vi = vi ); this assumption captures many kinds of markets such as some retail
markets (or bazaars) in which sellers post prices, and each seller does not care as to
which particular buyer she trades with. Our objective here is to explore the robust-
ness or otherwise of the results obtained above in section 4 concerning the role of the
main parameters on the equilibrium proportion of trades which occur at a posted
price.
We first examine how the parameters affect the equilibrium probability of trade
between an arbitrary pair of agents. This probability is
 = 1  Fj(R  vi ),
where R = Vi +Vj. For simplicity of calculation, we assume that b = s = ; and
denote r= by br.
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium Probability of Trade). Assume that Fj is differentiable, 1   Fj
is log-concave, Fi is degenerate (v¯i = vi = vi ), and b = s = . For any parameter
values such that R > vi + v j (where R = Vi +Vj), the equilibrium probability of trade 
is strictly increasing in br (where br = r=), and it is also strictly increasing in vi .
Thus, the equilibrium probability of trade between an arbitrary pair of agents
increases with the degree of market frictions and with the expected total value of a
match.9 An implication of this result is that a proportional mean preserving spread
of Fj generates a reduced rate of trading.
Proposition 4 implies that R( Vb +Vs) is strictly decreasing in br, with R ! 0 asbr ! 1, and R ! vi + v¯ j as br ! 0. These results imply that the comparative-static
results stated in Lemma 3 are valid for any parameter values when vi + v j  0. But
if vi + v j > 0, then, when br is sufficiently large, R < vi + v j (i.e., R < vi + v j,
for any v j). Hence, when br is sufficiently large, the equilibrium probability of trade
equals one. Indeed, this makes intuitive sense: when the degree of market frictions
is sufficiently large, the equilibrium payoffs to any pair of agents from not trading
(and thus, waiting to find an alternative trading partner) will be so small that they
will (for any v j) find it mutually beneficial to trade with each other.
We now explore how the parameters affect the equilibrium proportion of trades
which occur at a posted price (rather than at a renegotiated price). Let  denote this
9It may be noted that in terms of the pattern of trade, changes in vi are identical to changes in the
expected value of v j.
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proportion; thus, 1   denotes the proportion of trades that occur at a renegotiated
price. In the uniqueME, trade occurs at the posted price for any v j 2 [R j, v¯ j], and at a
renegotiated price for any v j 2 [R  vi , R j], where R j is a type j agent’s equilibrium
reservation value and R = Vi +Vj. Furthermore, for any v j 2 [v j, R  vi ] trade does
not occur (since it is not mutually beneficial to do so). Thus,
(4)  =
1  Fj(R j)
1  Fj(R  vi )
=
1  Fj(R j)

.
Proposition 6 (Equilibrium Trade at the Posted Price). Assume that Fj is differentiable,
1  Fj is log-concave, Fi is degenerate (v¯i = vi = vi ), and b = s = .
(a) The derivative of  with respect to br is in general ambiguous, where br = r=. If, however,
vi + v j > 0, then there exists a br and br where br > br > 0 such that over the interval
(br,br),  is strictly increasing in br, and  = 1 for all br > br.
(b) The derivative of  with respect to vi is in general ambiguous. However, there exists abvi and v˜i where bvi > v˜i > 0 such that over the interval (v˜i , bvi ),  is strictly increasing
in vi , and,  = 1 for all v

i > bvi .
The intuition for why the comparative-static results reported in the proposition
above are in general ambiguous is because changes in the appropriate parameters
have the same qualitative effect on both the denominator of the RHS of (4) — which
is the equilibrium probability of trade — and on the numerator of the RHS of (4) —
which is the equilibrium probability of trade at the posted price. We now discuss
the other results contained in Proposition 6.
An implication of the result in part (a) of the proposition is — as we also discov-
ered in the context of the case of uniform distributions in section 4 — that trade in
markets with relatively small frictions is more likely to occur at negotiated prices,
while in markets with relatively large frictions it is more likely to occur at posted
prices. This result makes sense, and the intuition for it was provided in section 4.
On the other hand, the appropriate result in part (b) of the proposition is at first
blush seemingly inconsistent with real-life markets. The result implies that trade in
retail markets for expensive items (such as cars and houses) should be more likely
to occur at posted prices, while in retail markets for relatively cheap items (such as
foodstuffs) trade is more likely to occur at negotiated prices.
As we now explain in the context of retail markets, the reason for why our model
generates this counter-intuitive relationship between the equilibrium proportion of
trades at the posted price and the expected total value of a match is because in our
model the matching rate (or equivalently the intensity of search) is exogenously
given.
Notice that an implication of the result (contained in Proposition 6(a)) is that
(when the matching rate is sufficiently small) the equilibrium proportion of trades
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at the posted price is strictly decreasing in the matching rate. Since the matching
rate is determined by the intensity with which buyers search for sellers, this result
implies that the more intensively buyers engage in search the more likely it is that
trade occurs at negotiated prices. But casual observation suggests that in real-life, re-
tail market buyers tend to search intensively when buying an expensive item (such
as a car or a house) and not when buying cheap items (such as foodstuffs). This
is because it is hardly more costly to find another auto dealership than it is to find
another supermarket. Accordingly, a simple extension of the model (which goes
beyond the scope of the current paper) would be to endogenize search intensity.
With search costs fixed, agents will search more intensively for larger ticket items
inducing a higher proportion of trades at bargained prices.
We now draw attention to another implication of the appropriate result contained
in Proposition 6(b). In the context of labour markets, suppose that firms are posting
wages, and that the variance of the distribution of a worker’s match-specific value
decreases. Since a decrease in the variance of Fj is formally equivalent to an increase
in vi ,
10 it follows immediately from Proposition 6(b) that as the variance of Fj de-
creases, the equilibrium proportion of trades at the posted price will increase. This
makes intuitive sense. That is partly because as the variability in v j decreases, the
likelihood that trade at the posted wage is individually rational for both parties in-
creases. And partly because as the variability in v j decreases, after having encoun-
tered some firm, a worker’s incentive to search for an alternative firm decreases,
since the likelihood of her obtaining a better match-specific value has decreased. In
the context of retail market, this result suggests that when comparing two items of
similar expected value, such as painting and computer, the item over which the id-
iosyncratic component of value has greater variance is more likely to be sold at a
bargained price (i.e. the painting).
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The two most fundamental results obtained in this paper — concerning markets
characterized by match-specific heterogeneity — are as follows:
 In such markets, some trades are executed at posted prices, while others at ne-
gotiated prices — with the exact proportions depending on the fundamentals such
as the degree of market frictions. In particular, trade in markets with small frictions
is likely to occur at negotiated prices, while in markets with large frictions it is more
likely to occur at posted prices. This implies, for example, that in retail markets in
10This is because an increase in vi is equivalent to an increase in the expected value of v j, which, in
turn, is equivalent (after normalization) to keeping the expected value of v j unchanged but decreas-
ing the variance of v j.
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which buyers search intensively (such as in housing markets) trade is more likely to
occur at negotiated prices, while in retail markets in which their intensity of search is
negligible (such as in the food market) trade is more likely to occur at posted prices.
 In general (when the numbers of sellers and buyers are unequal, or equivalently
when the matching rates are unequal) the posting of comprehensive price contracts
by agents on the short-side of themarket adversely affects aggregatemarket welfare.
To put it differently, when one side of the market has too much bargaining power
— by not only being able to post comprehensive price contracts but also by having
a relatively higher matching rate — aggregate market welfare is compromised.
Although our market model is the first to combine in a single framework (of en-
dogenous price determination) the triple features of (i) match-specific heterogene-
ity, (ii) the option to post prices, and (iii) the option to engage in mutually beneficial
renegotiation, the model contains some restrictive, simplifying assumptions. We
conclude by briefly considering some of them.
One such is the assumption that when a pair agents encounter each other, their
match-specific trading values become common knowledge between them. This as-
sumption ought to be relaxed in future research, since it is far more plausible that
after a pair of agents encounter each other, the realization of type k agent’s (k = b, s)
match-specific value vk is his private information.
Second, although the assumption that only one side of the market has the op-
tion to post prices may have merit from an applicability point of view — since it
is consistent with several real-life markets — it is interesting and important from a
theoretical perspective to give both sides of the market this option; and thus, to en-
dogenously determine (as part of a market equilibrium) the conditions under which
only one side exercises such an option.
Third, it would be interesting to extend our model by allowing the trading value
to be partly match-specific, but also partly endogenous, as a function of some in-
vestment decision. That is, the value vk to a type k agent from trading with some
particular typem agent (m 6= k) is a function fk(k, Ik), wherek is the match-specific
component (randomly realized after encountering this particular agent), while Ik is
his investment level made upfront before encountering any agent. Such an extended
model could also be interpreted from the perspective of the incomplete bilateral con-
tracting literature: unlike in that literature, in such a model the parties’ “outside
options” would now be endogenously determined as part of a market equilibrium.
Fourth, the assumption that the intensities with which agents search is exogenous
should be relaxed. As we informally discussed in section 5 above, such an extended
model is necessary in order to obtain the plausible relationship between the equi-
librium proportion of trades that occur at posted prices (vis-a-vis negotiated prices)
and the expected total value of a match. This is because as the expected total value
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of a match increases, it is intuitive that agents in real-life markets increase their in-
tensity of search — which (using the results obtained in this paper) would imply
an increase in the likelihood of trade occuring at negotiated prices (rather than at
posted prices).
APPENDIX
[Note: The proof of Lemma 2 is stated after the proof of Proposition 4.]
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix an arbitrary ME. We first establish, by contradiction, that
v¯b + v¯s > Vb +Vs. Thus suppose that v¯b + v¯s  Vb +Vs. This implies that trade never takes
place (i.e., 
P(pi ) = 
R(p

i ) = ;). Hence, it follows from (1) and (3) that Vb = Vs = 0. But
this, in turn, implies that v¯b + v¯s  0, which is a contradiction. We note that v¯b + v¯s > R
implies that Vs   v¯s < v¯b  Vb, where R = Vb +Vs. Define, for each  2 [0, v¯b + v¯s   R],
pi() =
8<:Vs   v¯s + if i = bv¯b  Vb   if i = s.
The following Claim implies that Vs   v¯s < pi < v¯b  Vb, which, in turn (and as required),
implies Proposition 1.
Claim A.1. There exists an  2 (0, v¯b + v¯s   R) such that Zi(pi(),Vb,Vs) > Zi(p,Vb,Vs) for
any p  v¯b  Vb and for any p  Vs   v¯s.
Proof of Claim A.1. If p is such that either p  v¯b   Vb or p  Vs   v¯s, then 
P(p) = ;,
which implies that for any such p,
(5) Zi(p,Vb,Vs) =
Z v¯i
vi=R v¯ j
Z v¯ j
v j=R vi
 
vb + vs   R
2
!
dFbdFs.
Notice that for any such p, Zi(p,Vb,Vs) is independent of p — since for any such p the
terms of trade are determined (for any possible realization of vb and vs) ex-post bargaining.
Furthermore,
Zi(pi(),Vb,Vs) =
Z v¯i
vi=R v¯ j+
Z v¯ j
v j=v¯ j 
(vi + v¯ j   R )dFbdFs + C+ D, where
C =
Z vi=R v¯ j+
vi=R v¯ j
Z v¯ j
v j=R vi
 
vb + vs   R
2
!
dFbdFs and
D =
Z v¯i
vi=R v¯ j+
Z v¯ j 
v j=R vi
 
vb + vs   R
2
!
dFbdFs.
For notational convenience, define Gi() = 2[Zi(pi(),Vb,Vs)   Zi(p,Vb,Vs)]. Since the
right-hand side of (5) equalsZ v¯i
vi=R v¯ j+
Z v¯ j
v j=v¯ j 
 
vb + vs   R
2
!
dFbdFs + C+ D, it follows that
Gi() =
Z v¯i
vi=R v¯ j+
Z v¯ j
v j=v¯ j 
"
(vi + v¯ j   R )  [v j   (v¯ j  )]
#
dFbdFs.
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Thus, for any  2 [0, v¯b + v¯s   R],
Gi() =  	0j(v¯ j  )	i(R  v¯ j +) + 	 j(v¯ j  )	0i(R  v¯ j +),
where for each x = b, s and for any z 2 <,
(6) 	x(z) =
Z vx=v¯x
vx=z
[1  Fx(vx)]dvx =
Z vx=v¯x
vx=z
(vx   z)dFx.
It may be noted that 	0x(z) =  [1  Fx(z)].
Since 	0x(z) =  [1  Fx(z)], and for any  > 0, 	 j(v¯ j  ) < [1  Fj(v¯ j  )], it follows
that for any  2 (0, v¯b + v¯s   R],
Gi() > [1  Fj(v¯ j  )][	i(R  v¯ j +) +	0i(R  v¯ j +)].
We now show that there exists an ¯i, where 0 < ¯i < v¯b + v¯s  R, such that for any 2 (0, ¯i)
the right-hand side of the above inequality is strictly positive — which implies that Gi() >
0, as required.
Let hi() = 	i(R  v¯ j+)+	0i(R  v¯ j+). Since (by definition) Fi is right-continuous, it
follows that hi is right-continuous at  = 0. Now notice (since v¯b + v¯s > R) that hi(0) > 0. It
thus follows that there exists an ¯i (where 0 < ¯i < v¯b + v¯s   R) such that for any  2 (0, ¯i),
hi() > 0. The desired result follows immediately, since for any  > 0, 1  Fj(v¯ j  ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. For each i = b, s, let RCi denote the sum of the equilibrium
payoffs to a pair of agents of the opposite types in the unique ME when the type i agents
post comprehensive price contracts, and, let RIi denote the sum of the equilibrium payoffs
to a pair of agents of the opposite types in an arbitrary ME when the type i agents just post
prices.
First suppose that b = s. It follows from Claim A.2 below that RIb = R
C
b and R
I
s = RCs .
Part (a) of the proposition now follows immediately since RCb = R
C
s , and (when thematching
rates are identical) aggregate market welfareW equals one-half of the sum of the payoffs to
a pair of agents of the opposite types.
Now we establish part (b) of the proposition. Thus, now suppose that b < s. It follows
from Claim A.2 that RIb > R
C
b and R
I
s < RCs . Furthermore,
WCb =
s
b + s
RCb and W
I
b =
s
b + s
h
V Ib+
b
s

V Is
i
.
Now
RCb =
b
r
ZZ
vb+vsRCb
[vb + vs   RCb ]dFbdFs,
and equations 1 and 3 imply that
V Ib+
b
s

V Is =
b
r
ZZ
vb+vsRIb
[vb + vs   RIb]dFbdFs.
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Hence, since the integral ZZ
vb+vsR
[vb + vs   R]dFbdFs
is strictly decreasing in R, and since Claim A.2 below implies that RIb > R
C
b , it therefore
follows thatW Ib < W
C
b . By a symmetric argument, since Claim A.2 implies that R
I
s < RCs , it
follows thatW Is >WCs .
Claim A.2.
RIi T RCi if i S  j.
Proof of Claim A.2. It follows from equations 1 and 3 that
rVi
i
+
rVj
 j
=
ZZ
vb+vsR
[vb + vs   R]dFbdFs,
where R = Vb + Vs. Now define k =  j=i. After substituting for  j (using this latter
expression) in the above equation, and re-arranging, we obtain that
(7)
r(1  k)Vj
k
= (R),
where
(R) = i
ZZ
vb+vsR
[vb + vs   R]dFbdFs   rR.
In any ME, Vj and Rmust satisfy (7). Now notice that RCi is the unique value of R such that
(R) = 0. Furthermore, note that since the first term of (.) is strictly decreasing in R, it
follows that (.) is strictly decreasing in R. Given these properties of  , it is now trivial to
establish Claim A.2. First note that if k = 1 then it follows from (7) that in anyME,(R) = 0;
hence, RIi = R
C
i . Secondly, note that if k < 1 then — since in any ME, Vj > 0 — it follows
from (7) that (R) > 0; hence, RIi < R
C
i . And finally, by a similar argument, if k > 1 then
RIi > R
C
i .
Proof of Proposition 3. In order to establish this proposition, we first need to derive
Claim A.3 (stated below) that provides an alternative characterization of the set of ME. It
then follows by subtracting (9) from (8) — stated below in Claim A.3 — that the difference
between the equilibrium payoffs (in any ME)
Vi  Vj =
(i    j)R
b + s
+
2bs bGi(R)
r(b + s)
,
where R and bGi(R) are defined below in Claim A.3. Proposition 3 is now an immediate
consequence of the observation that bGi(R) > 0 and R > 0.
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Claim A.3. Fix i and j, where i, j = b, s with i 6= j. (Vi,Vj, pi ) defines a ME if and only if
Vi =
iR
b + s
+
bs bGi(R)
r(b + s)
(8)
Vj =
 jR
b + s
  bs
bGi(R)
r(b + s)
(9)
pi =
8<:Vs   v¯s +b if i = bv¯b  Vb  s if i = s,
where R is a fixed point of b i, i 2 i(R) such that R =  i(R,i ), andbGi(R) = max
2[0,q¯+e¯ R]
Gi(; R), with
i(R) = fi : Gi(i ; R)  Gi(; R) 8 2 [0, v¯b + v¯s   R]g, where
(10) Gi(; R) =  	0j(v¯ j  )	i(R  v¯ j +) + 	 j(v¯ j  )	0i(R  v¯ j +)
(11)  i(R,i ) =
b + s
2r
"Z v¯i
vi=R v¯ j+i
	 j(R  vi)dFi +
Z v¯ j
v j=v¯ j i
	i(R  v j)dFj
#
+
i	 j(v¯ j  i )	0i(R  v¯ j +i )
r
+
 j	
0
j(v¯ j  i )	i(R  v¯ j +i )
r
Furthermore, for each R 2 [0, v¯b + v¯s], b i(R) = f i(R,i ) : i 2 i(R)g.
Proof of Claim A.3. It is easy to show that equations 1 and 3 can be respectively rewritten
as follows:
2rVi
i
=
Z v¯i
vi=Ri
	 j(R  vi)dFi +
Z v¯ j
v j=R j
	i(R  v j)dFj + 2	 j(R j)	0i(Ri)(12)
2rVj
 j
=
Z v¯i
vi=Ri
	 j(R  vi)dFi +
Z v¯ j
v j=R j
	i(R  v j)dFj + 2	i(Ri)	0j(R j),(13)
where Rb = Vb + pi , Rs = Vs   pi , R = Rb + Rs and, for each x = b, s and for any z 2 <,
	x(z) is define in (6). It follows immediately from the arguments in the proof of Proposition
2 above that in any ME, the equilibrium posted price pi is as follows:
pi =
8<:Vs   v¯s +b if i = bv¯b  Vb  s if i = s,
for some i 2 i(R), where i(R) is defined in Claim A.3. It thus follows that a ME can be
characterized by a triple (Vb,Vs,i ) which satisfies equations 12 and 13 with R j = v¯ j  i
and Ri = R  v¯ j +i , and such that i 2 i(R). Substituting for Ri and R j in (12) and (13)
using these latter expressions, it follows (by adding (12) and (13)) that R =  i(R,i ), where
 i(R,i ) is defined in Claim A.3. Hence, (Vb,Vs, p

i ) defines a ME only if R(= Vb +Vs) is a
fixed point of b i, where the correspondence b i is defined in Claim A.3. This, then, establishes
Claim A.3.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Fix an arbitrary ME. In order to emphasize the dependence of
the sum of the equilibrium payoffs to a pair of agents of the opposite types on the discount
rate, we write it as R(r). Now consider two arbitrary values of the discount rate, rH > rL.
We need to show that R(rL) > R(rH). We argue by contradiction. Thus, suppose, to the
contrary, that R(rL)  R(rH). It follows from equation (7) — since for any R, (R; r) is
strictly decreasing in r— that therefore rHVj(rH) < rLVj(rL). But this implies that Vj(rH) <
Vj(rL), which, in turn, implies that Vi(rH) < Vi(rL). Hence, it follows that R(rH) < R(rL),
which contradicts our supposition.
We now show that R ! v¯b + v¯s as r ! 0. In the limit as r ! 0, the LHS of (7) converges to
zero, and hence, the RHS must also converge to zero. This implies that in the limit as r ! 0,ZZ
vb+vsR
[vb + vs   R]dFbdFs
must converge to zero. Hence, Rmust converge to v¯b + v¯s.
We now show that R ! 0 as r ! 1. After dividing equation 7 by r, it follows that in the
limit as r ! 1, it must be the case that Vj=k+Vi ! 0. Hence, R ! 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Part (a)
Here we establish the existence of a ME by allowing agents of type i to randomize over
their choice of the posted price. This existence result only requires that both Fb and Fs are
continuous, which allows us to use the Theorem of the Maximum, from which it follows that
i(.) is compact valued and upper hemi-continuous (uhc), wherei is defined in Claim A.3
above.
A type i agent randomizes over two prices — that is, over two values of i . The value of
i is realized after he encounters an agent of the opposite type but before the match-specific
values are realized. A randomization is a triple (i1,

i2, ) where p is the probability with
which i1 is selected.
From the definition and derivation of Gi(; R)—which is provided in the proof of Propo-
sition 1 — it should be clear that the amended problem for the type i agent is now to pick
(i1,i2, ) from [0, v¯i + v¯ j  R]2 [0, 1] to maximize Gi(i1; R) + (1  )Gi(i2; R). Hence,
the optimal pair i1 and 

i2 can be chosen arbitrarily from i(R). Given this choice, 
 is
arbitrary.
Amending (12) and (13) to allow for randomizations, and then adding them implies that
in equilibrium R 2 (R), where
(R) = f :  =  minfb i(R)g+ (1  )maxfb i(R)g for some  2 [0, 1]g.
Because  i(R, .) is continuous, b i(.) is compact valued and uhc. Hence,  : [0, v¯i + v¯ j] !
[0, v¯i + v¯ j] is compact valued, convex valued and uhc. An equilibrium is fully character-
ized as a fixed point of . This is because any R 2  (R) identifies a randomization
fi1,i2, g such that  i(R,i1) = minfb i(R)g and  i(R,i2) = maxfb i(R)g and  =
[R  minfb  (R)g]=[maxfb  (R)g  minfb  (R)g], which is consistent with type i agents’
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optimal behaviour at R = R. Given this randomization, the threshold value for the sum of
the match specific preference shocks, vi + v j, at which trade occurs is exactly R. Existence
of a ME is now a consequence of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem.
Proof of Part (b)
In order to establish this part of the proposition, we shall make use of the characterization
of the set of ME given in Claim A.3 above.
It is straightforward to show that when Fi is degenerate, the expression for Gi(; R) de-
fined in Claim A.3 reduces to:
Gi(; R) =  (vi + v¯ j    R)	0j(v¯ j  )  	 j(v¯ j  ).
Hence, if Fj is differentiable then the derivative of Gi with respect to ,
(14) G0i(; R) = (v

i + v¯ j    R)	00j (v¯ j  ) + 2	0j(v¯ j  ).
It follows from Claim A.1 above that for any i 2 i(R), it must be the case that 0 <
i < v¯b + v¯s   R. Hence, it follows that i 2 i(R) only if G0i(i ; R) = 0. It thus follows
immediately from (14) that i 2 i(R) only if i is a solution to the following equation in 
(where  2 [0, vi + v¯ j   R]):
(15) vi + v¯ j    R =  
2	0j(v¯ j  )
	00j (v¯ j  )
.
Notice that the left-hand side of (15) is strictly decreasing in over the closed interval [0, vi +
v¯ j   R]— taking a strictly positive value at  = 0, and taking a value of zero when  = vi +
v¯ j R. Over the same closed interval, log-concavity of 1  Fj implies that the right-hand side
is increasing from zero to a strictly positive number. Hence, there exists a unique solution in
 to (15). It is thus follows that this unique solution constitutes the unique element ofi(R).
Hence, b i is a function, and thus, R is a fixed point of b i if and only if R = b i(R,i (R)). That
is, using (11) — after simplifying it using the assumption that Fi is degenerate — if and only
if R satisfies
(16) 2rR = (i +  j)	 j(R  vi )+
( j   i)[(vi + v¯ j  i (R)  R)	0j(v¯ j  i (R)) + 	 j(v¯ j  i (R))].
We now establish that there exists a unique solution in R to the above equation. Hence, it
follows from Claim A.3 that there exists a unique ME. The set of feasible values of R is the
closed interval [0, vi + v¯ j]. The left-hand side of (16) increases over this interval — taking
the value of zero when R = 0, and taking the value of 2r(vi + v¯ j) when R = v

i + v¯ j.
Differentiating the right-hand side of (16) with respect to R yields
(i +  j)	
0
j(R  vi )  ( j   i)
"
(vi + v¯ j  i (R)  R)0i (R)	00j (v¯ j  i (R))+
(20i (R) + 1)	
0
j(v¯ j  i (R))
#
.
EX-ANTE PRICE COMMITMENT WITH RENEGOTIATION IN A DYNAMIC MARKET 23
Then, using (15) this derivative reduces to
(i +  j)	
0
j(R  vi )  ( j   i)	0j(v¯ j  i (R)),
which is less than or equal to zero — since 0  i (R)  vi + v¯ j   R. Finally, note that at
R = vi + v¯ j, the right-hand side of (16) is zero — since 

i (v

i + v¯ j) = 0. Hence, since both
sides of (16) are continuous in R, there exists a unique solution in R to (16).
Proof of Lemma 3. Under the restriction that i =  j, equation 16 reduces to brR =
	 j(R  vi ). Hence, we obtain that
0 <
¶R
¶vi
< 1 and
¶R
¶br < 0.
The lemma now follows immediately from this results.
Proof of Proposition 6. Fix x = br, vi . It follows from (4) that
¶
¶x
=
1
2
h
 F0j(R j)
¶R j
¶x
+ [1  Fj(R j)]F0j(R  vi )
¶(R  vi )
¶x
i
.
Equation 15 can be written as:
vi + R j   R+
2	0j(R j)
	00j (R j)
= 0.
Given the comparative-static results on R derived above in the proof of Lemma 3, and since
(by the assumption that 1  Fj is log-concave) 	0j(R j)=	00j (R j) is strictly increasing in R j, it
is straightforward to show that therefore R j is strictly decreasing in x. Hence, it follows that
the derivative of  with respect to x is in general ambiguous.
Now suppose that vi + v j > 0. Once again, fix x = br, vi . It is straightforward to show
from the equation that determines R — namely, brR = 	 j(R   vi ) — that there exists a
value of x — call it x¯ — such that for any x > x¯, R   vi  v j. Thus, for any x > x¯, the
equilibrium probability of trade  = 1. Now note that since R j is strictly decreasing in x (as
shown above), the equilibrium probability of trade at the posted price 1  Fj(R j) is strictly
increasing in x. The appropriate results in Proposition 6 (when vi + v j > 0) concerning the
relationship between  and x (for values of x > x¯) now follow immediately.
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